Human Rights and the New Zealand Government's Treaty Obligations by Palmer, Geoffrey
57 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEW 
ZEALAND GOVERNMENT'S TREATY 
OBLIGATIONS 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer * 
The International Law Association established a New Zealand branch in Wellington in 1996. 
The following paper is an edited version of the speech made by Sir Geoffrey Palmer, on the 
occasion of the inaugural meeting of the Association in Auckland on 30 April 1998. 
I THE PLACE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY NEW 
ZEALAND SOCIETY 
It is now trite to observe that international law, and obligations entered into 
internationally, drive a great amount of New Zealand's domestic law.  New Zealand law 
on a wide range of issues must take into account and is often bound by the relevant 
international norm or obligation.  To a degree unimagined 50 years ago New Zealand 
cannot please itself as to what policies it pursues.  It is constrained by international 
developments and international law. 
In New Zealand's relations with other nations the practical, everyday rules of 
cooperation cover a wide range of matters ­ postage, civil aviation, weather information, 
communications, customs, diplomatic and consular relations, visas, trade rules, banking 
obligations, money exchange, the ever­expanding umbrella of human rights, and a 
multitude of others.  Many of these matters are regulated through international treaties 
and conventions.  Some have international organisations and tribunals tasked with 
looking after or supervising the functions.  The obligations place a substantial restraint 
upon the New Zealand Government's freedom of action, but in many cases New Zealand 
also derives great benefit from them. 
* President, International Law Association; Partner, Chen & Palmer, Barristers & Solicitors, 
Wellington. 
Sir Geoffrey was the chairperson of the NZ Institute of International Affairs UDHR Seminar held 
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In his book The End of the Nation State (1995) Kenichi Ohmae talks of "a cross­border 
civilization". 1 The French observer Jean­Marie Guehenno says: 2 
Having lost the authority conferred on them by their role as depositories of a public interest, 
overtaken by the globalization of the new circuits of wealth, in competition with the wealth of 
new actors, manipulated by interests more often more powerful than themselves, the nation­ 
states, exhausted and sickly, will increasingly be suspected of condemning corruption only to 
protect what power is left to them. 
This is a sombre thought and one which in some ways makes the range of 
international law and its content of even greater importance. 
There is an increasing amount of writing on the effects of globalisation and opinions 
on the subject vary widely.  Some say it is inevitable and to be welcomed.  Others say that 
it will remove the sovereign state as we know it and democracy with it, allowing 
international multi­national capitalism to rule.  It is not necessary to take a position on 
these issues here, except to note that they are of central importance. 
What we do know about international law is that the methods of making and 
enforcing it are fundamentally different from municipal law.  The number of new treaties 
which appear on the scene with increasing regularity is extraordinarily high.  It has been 
calculated that two new treaties are made every day worldwide. New Zealand has an 
invaluable publication in two volumes published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade entitled the New Zealand Consolidated Treaty List. 3 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade tells me that New Zealand is bound by the provisions of 970 multilateral 
treaties and 717 bilateral ones.  In other words, New Zealand is bound by more treaties 
than there are statutes in force passed by the New Zealand Parliament. 
The Law Commission in its Report A New Zealand Guide to International Law and its 
Sources 4 commented at para 7: 5 
About a quarter of New Zealand public Acts appear to raise issues connected with 
international law ....  Any proposal to amend such legislation should prompt the question 
whether there is a treaty which must be taken into consideration.  Even when there is no direct 
1 Kenichi Ohmae The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (Harper Collins, London, 
1995). 
2 Jean­Marie Guehenno The End of the Nation­State (University of Minnesota Press, 1995) 108. 
3 Compiled by Tony Small, and published in 1997. 
4 NZLC R34. 
5 See Sir Kenneth Keith "Sovereignty ?  A Legal Perspective", Address to Foreign Policy School, 29 
June 1996, 8­9.
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obligation, there may well be an international standard ­ especially in the human rights area ­ 
which is relevant to the preparation of new legislation and the replacement and amendment of 
the old.  It may also be relevant to the interpretation of legislation. 
This estimate does not include the many regulations which also give effect to treaty 
provisions or empower the Government to give effect to them. 
Apart from the increase in sheer quantity of international instruments that bear upon 
the conduct of states, three features of international law since the Second World War 
stand out.  The first is the enormous range of treaties concerning the environment, an 
area which prior to the Second World War would hardly have entered the international 
lawyer's consciousness.  While that is a great and important subject it is not on tonight's 
agenda.  My views of it have been set out elsewhere. 6 The second feature and one even 
more remarkable is the development of international human rights law.  The third is the 
burgeoning quantity of international trade law and the formation of the World Trade 
Organisation. 
II INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW 
For many years international law and municipal law have been seen as two separate 
circles that never intersect.  Increasingly, however, the way to look at them, I suggest, is 
that they are two circles with a substantial degree of overlap and indeed it can be argued 
that there is only one circle. 
Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England contains a famous 
passage about the importance of international law, more honoured in the former 
American colonies than it was in Blackstone's homeland in the years that followed.  The 
statement is worthy of full quotation: 7 
In arbitrary states this law, wherever it contradicts or is not provided for by the municipal law 
of the country, is enforced by the royal power: but since in England no royal power can 
introduce a new law, or suspend the execution of the old, therefore the law of nations 
(wherever any question arises, which is properly the object of its jurisdiction) is here adopted 
in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land.  And those 
acts of parliament which have from time to time been made to enforce this universal law, or to 
facilitate the execution of its decisions, are not to be considered as introductive of any new rule, 
6 G W R Palmer Environment: The International Challenge (VUP, Wellington, 1995); L D Guruswamy, 
G W R Palmer, Burns H Weston International Environmental Law and World Order: A Problem Oriented 
Course Book (1994). 
7 Vol IV, 67.
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but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental constitutions of the kingdom: without which 
it must cease to be a part of the civilised world. 
There have been a few cases which have discussed the issue, although not many.  The 
effect of the authorities is authoritatively summarised in the latest edition of Oppenheim: 8 
The application of international law as part of the law of the land means that, subject to the 
overriding effect of statute law, rights and duties flowing from rules of customary international 
law will be recognised and given effect by English courts without the need for any specific act 
adopting those rules into English law.  It also means that international law is part of the lex fori 
and does not have to be proved as a fact in English courts in the same way as foreign law; 
although evidence of state practice or received international opinion is permitted in order to 
establish the existence or content of a rule of international law.  Judicial notice is taken of the 
conclusion of treaties by the United Kingdom. 
There is a wonderful academic argument at international law about the difference 
between monism and dualism as a proper explanation for the jurisprudential nature of 
international law.  According to the dualist theory international law and domestic law are 
seen as and are to be analysed as totally separate legal systems.  It is submitted that this 
position can no longer be supported, if it ever could, and it certainly cannot be supported 
in New Zealand. 9 It is not correct to say that in New Zealand international law may 
apply within the State only when its principles have been incorporated into the internal 
domestic law of the State.  Such a position is incompatible with the obligations that New 
Zealand has undertaken and the principle of good faith which accompanies them. 10 
In 1991 the House of Lords in the United Kingdom decided that the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights could not be 
directly invoked in English courts to determine whether administrative discretion 
exercised under broad statutory powers had unnecessarily interfered with those rights or 
freedoms or had been disproportionate to the decision­makers' aim. 11 
The reasoning has been severely criticised and it is doubtful whether it could ever be 
the position in New Zealand.  It may well be that New Zealand courts would prefer the 
legitimate expectation theory advanced in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v 
8 International Law (1992) Volume 1, Introduction and Part I, 57. 
9 See J B Elkind and A Shaw, "The Municipal Enforcement of the Prohibition Against Racial 
Discrimination: A Case Study on New Zealand and the 1981 Springbok Tour" (1984) 55 BYIL 189, 
233­241. 
10 See art 26 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
11 Brind v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1991] AC 696.
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Teoh. 12 The English position will inevitably be transformed by the introduction in 
October 1997 of the Human Rights Bill, the purpose of which is to incorporate and give 
express domestic effect to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The monism argument is likely to become considerably stronger in New Zealand now 
that the processes for Parliament's consideration of international conventions and treaties 
that the Government is intending to enter has altered. 
III PARLIAMENTARY INVOLVEMENT WITH TREATIES 
In a little­noticed report tabled late in 1997, the Foreign Affairs and Trade and Defence 
Select Committee of Parliament made a report which contained six significant 
recommendations.  These were: 
1 That, for a trial period of 12 months, all treaties which are subject to 
ratification, accession, acceptance or approval (which for the most part will be 
multilateral treaties) should be tabled in the House prior to ratification, 
accession, acceptance or approval and be subject to the following procedure. 
2 A document along the lines of a "National Interest Analysis" would be 
prepared for each treaty and tabled in the House at the same time. 
3 Both the treaty and accompanying "National Interest Analysis" would be 
referred to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee upon tabling. 
This committee could retain the treaty documents for itself, or refer them to a 
more appropriate select committee, for inquiry and report back to the House, if 
the relevant committee considers an inquiry necessary, within 15 sitting days 
of tabling in the House. 
4 If requested by members, the House should provide an opportunity for 
members to debate any select committee reports on treaties in the House (in 
addition to the existing opportunities and the proposal in recommendation 1). 
5 The Government will not ratify, accede to, accept or approve any treaty until 
after a select committee reports on its inquiry into a treaty or 15 sitting days 
elapses from the date the treaty is tabled, whichever occurs first. 
6 In the event that the Government needs to take urgent action in the national 
interest in ratifying, accepting or approving a treaty, and it is not possible to 
12 (1995) 69 ALJR 423.
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table it beforehand, it will be tabled as soon as possible after such action has 
been taken together with an explanation to the House. 13 
As the report observed, the recommendations represented a significant advancement 
in Parliament's role in the international treaty process.  It is significant also that the 
Executive Government tabled a response to the recommendations in the House of 
Representatives saying "it was broadly willing to accept them with some modifications". 
The trial will run for the rest of the Parliamentary term.  Major bilateral treaties of 
particular significance may also be subject to the procedure on a case by case basis.  The 
Government response also adjusts the time frames put forward by the Select Committee. 
It is suggested that Parliamentary scrutiny of treaties in this new manner bolsters the 
argument in favour of courts giving enhanced weight to treaties to which New Zealand 
has acceded or ratified, even in the event that there is no complementary local legislation. 
IV INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
The Second World War produced such universal feelings of revulsion about inhuman 
acts towards individuals and peoples that it led to a remarkable international 
development with the overt support of states.  Human rights became legally recognised 
at international law.  And international law, which had previously been the concern of 
states alone, has gradually provided a framework for the delivery of human rights to 
individuals and in some cases to peoples. 
The evolving framework of international human rights law has its modern origins in 
the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the preamble (which sets out the purposes 
and principles of the organisation) and in articles 1, 13, 55, 56, 73­74.  Although not often 
acknowledged, members of the United Nations are under a legal obligation to act in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.  Under the Charter, they 
have a legal duty to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 14 
The paramount position that fundamental human rights enjoy in contemporary 
international law is illustrated by a statement of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht: 15 
Insofar as the denial of fundamental rights has been associated with the nation­state asserting 
the claim to ultimate reality and utterly subordinating the individual to a mystic and absolute 
13 "Inquiry into Parliament's Role in the International Treaty Process" Appendix to the Journals of the 
House, 1997, I.4A. 
14 Article 1(3). 
15 International Law and Human Rights (Stevens, London, 1950), 70.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT'S TREATY OBLIGATIONS 63 
personality of its own, the recognition of these rights is a brake upon the exclusive and 
aggressive nationalism, which is the obstacle, both conscious and involuntary, to the idea of a 
world community under the rule of law. 
Following the United Nations Charter, three documents were negotiated that are 
often referred to collectively as "The International Bill of Rights".  These documents are 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966).  To that list the First Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) is often rightly added. 
The Universal Declaration was a declaration, not a treaty, and did not give rise to 
binding international obligations except to the extent that its provisions entered the realm 
of customary international law, as arguably, some articles of the Declaration have. 
Consider for example the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, American Law Institute, 1987, which has a provision about customary 
international law and human rights: 
702. Customary International Law of Human Rights 
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or 
condones: 
(a) genocide, 
(b) slavery or slave trade, 
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, 
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, 
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention, 
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or 
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights. 
This statement of customary international law is identical in content to article 3 (right 
to life), article 4 (no­one shall be held in slavery), article 5 (torture or other cruel 
punishment), article 9 (arbitrary amnesty, detention) and article 2 (no racial 
discrimination) of the Universal Declaration. 
The other instruments in the Bill of Rights are "hard" law treaties and they have been 
ratified or acceded to by New Zealand as long ago as 1978 in the case of the first two, and 
1989 with respect to the First Optional Protocol.  New Zealand has also ratified the 
Second Optional Protocol which commits New Zealand irrevocably against the death 
penalty.  New Zealand's decision to accede to the First Optional Protocol enables 
individuals subject to New Zealand jurisdiction to make complaints (called
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communications) to the Human Rights Committee against the Government where they 
claim to be victims of a violation of any of the Covenant rights. 
There is little doubt that that body of international law known as human rights law is, 
as Her Excellency Judge Rosalyn Higgins has pointed out in an essay: 16 
strikingly different from the rest of international law, in that it stipulates that obligations are 
owed directly to individuals (and not to the national government of an individual); and it 
provides, increasingly, for individuals to have access to tribunals and fora for the effective 
guarantees of those obligations. 
Human rights are often stated to be universal.  The universality of international 
human rights has profound implications.  Some argue that it must be understood as a 
relativistic concept, that the human rights enjoyed by the inhabitant of an advanced 
industrialised country cannot be the same as those of a person in a developing country. 
Some countries, notably China, argue that human rights arguments are a way to force 
western standards and concepts on a non­western society.  No doubt the character of 
legal systems one from another is very different but the content of the international norm 
cannot vary and it is that that gives rise to the obligations.  This is easier to understand 
when it is remembered that the international Bill of Rights reflects minimum standards; 
the most basic pre­requisites that recognise the humanity of all individuals. However 
cultural and religious diversity are to be respected, it cannot be by different standards 
arising out of the same principles of universal application.  As Judge Higgins has 
explained: 17 
The international covenants, in particular, benefited in their formulation, which took place over 
a long period of years, in the participation of states from all parts of the world, representing all 
the political and religious systems.  The texts were adopted with general approval; and states 
of all the varying political and religious systems have a free choice as to whether to become a 
party to the Covenants.  If particular elements in the Covenants were really to be regarded as 
incompatible with a profound religious tenet or political point of departure, then the correct 
course of action was to enter a reservation as to those elements.  It is striking that this has in 
fact not been done ­ reservations rarely go to these rather important points of religious and 
political philosophy.  If it is not done, then in my view sensitivity to political and cultural 
diversity does not require that a state be regarded as exempted from what has been 
undertaken. 
16 Rosalyn Higgins "Problems and Process ­ International Law and How We Use It" (1995) 95. 
17 Higgins, above n 16, 98.
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Sir Kenneth Keith has commented: 18 
[A] number of important international treaties appear not to be subject to withdrawal at all. 
Notable instances occur in the human rights area.  Both of the human rights covenants and the 
second protocol to the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, on the abolition of the death 
penalty, contain no provisions for their termination.  By contrast other human rights 
instruments do. 
[T]he Australian Attorney­General recently expressed the view that there is no power to 
withdraw from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1995) 16 Aust YBIL 
470­471.  The reasoning applies equally to the other Covenant and the second optional protocol 
relating to capital punishment.  That particular point gives heightened significance to the 
matters of a constitutional kind ... 
The UN Human Rights Committee, in its most recent General Comment adopted 
under article 40(4), has expressed the position most succinctly: 19 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not contain any provision 
regarding its termination and does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal. 
[I]t is clear that the Covenant is not the type of treaty which, by its nature, implies a right of 
denunciation. 
... 
The Committee is therefore firmly of the view that international law does not permit a State 
which has ratified or acceded or succeeded to the Covenant to denounce it or withdraw from it. 
I sometimes wonder if that legal position is well known to the New Zealand 
Parliament and Ministers. 
V NEW ZEALAND'S RESPONSE 
At the international level New Zealand has been a supporter of international human 
rights.  As a long­time member of the international community and one of the founding 
members of the United Nations, New Zealand has always been an enthusiastic supporter 
of human rights and the development of careful treaties defining them. 
New Zealand has always prided itself on its international human rights record.  The 
United States State Department does a study of human rights violations around the world 
and frequently when this comes out the New Zealand media publicises the fact that New 
Zealand has a more or less clean bill of health. 
18 Keith, above n 5, 12­13. 
19 General Comment No 26(61) adopted on 29 October 1997, paras 1, 3 and 5.
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Since New Zealand assumed the obligations under the Covenant, it has been obliged 
to give periodic reports on compliance with it.  The reception given to these reports has 
not always been quite as complimentary as New Zealand authorities may have wished. 
On the last occasion, for example, it was observed that we did not seem to have a good 
reason for our Bill of Rights Act not being supreme law.  The Human Rights Committee 
noted that it is expressly possible under the terms of the Bill of Rights Act to enact 
legislation contrary to its provisions and regretted that this appeared to have been done 
in a few cases. 20 New Zealand has also passed some highly dubious law relating to 
censorship, using the term "objectionable publication", which almost certainly is in breach 
of our international obligations. 21 In a written question, the Committee requested more 
information of the NZ delegation on the effect of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 on 
the earnings level of women (including Maori and Pacific Island women) and their 
participation in the workforce. 22 Later in the Report the Committee noted with regret that 
despite improvements Maori were still disadvantaged in relation to access to health, 
education and employment. 23 
Looking back with the advantage of hindsight, New Zealand was enthusiastic to 
embrace internationally promulgated norms on human rights but not so anxious to 
monitor its own domestic laws and practices to see that they were fully in compliance 
with those international obligations.  We always assumed, or so it seems to me, that the 
good sense of Parliament could be relied upon to ensure that domestic legislation would 
not breach the norms that we had undertaken. 
It appears, however, to be increasingly clear that the mechanisms within Parliament 
are not adequate to achieve that goal. 24 
As the 1985 White Paper, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand, observed no Government or 
Parliament were likely in New Zealand to attempt to sweep away basic rights.  The real 
point of a Bill of Rights was different: 25 
20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Human Rights in New Zealand : New Zealand's Third Report to 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee on Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, Information Bulletin No 54, June 1995 p 69, para 11. 
21 Above n 20, pp 69­70, paras 15 and 22; Re New Truth and TV Extra, 4 November 1994 (1996) 3 
HRNZ 162, 176­177. 
22 Above n 20, No 54, p 40. 
23 Above n 20, p 70, para 17. 
24 See also Cabinet Office Manual references to international obligations. 
25 White Paper, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985) para 4.10.
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What is in point is the continual danger ­ the constant temptation for a zealous Executive ­ of 
making small erosions of these rights.  In some instances there may be a plausible argument 
based on expediency.  But each small step makes the next small step easier and more seductive. 
For many years the needs, or alleged needs, of implementing a host of policies ­ or still worse of 
administrative convenience ­ have pressed against personal rights and freedoms. 
Although the proposal to entrench the Bill of Rights and give it supreme law status 
was not proceeded with, the Bill of Rights has nevertheless had a significant effect on 
New Zealand jurisprudence.  And while it is dangerous to generalise about it, the body 
of case law would suggest that when we come to matters of detail the New Zealand 
legislature has not been as meticulous as the received wisdom suggested it was about 
protecting basic rights.  Neither have the administrative and judicial authorities been 
altogether zealous in ensuring that the exercise of state power remains within the norms. 
This is surprising, especially in light of the long title to the Bill of Rights and section 
3(a) which expressly provides that the Bill of Rights, subject to section 4, applies to acts of 
the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the Government. 
In my view, the experience we have had with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
suggests that it was necessary in New Zealand to enact a statute in furtherance of its 
obligations under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights if those 
obligations were to be properly observed. 
Remember that the long title of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is: 
An Act ­ 
. . . 
(h) To affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New 
Zealand; and 
(i) To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
In Ministry of Transport v Noort; Police v Curran 26 Cooke P (as he then was) stressed 
that "[i]n approaching the Bill of Rights Act it must be of cardinal importance to bear in 
mind [its international] antecedents". 
It is as well to remember also the words of Cooke P in Tavita v The Minister of 
Immigration 27 when His Honour was considering the First Optional Protocol and the fact 
26 [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 270. 
27 [1994] 2 NZLR 257.
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that it gave an individual subject to New Zealand jurisdiction, who had exhausted all 
available domestic remedies, a right to submit a communication to the Human Rights 
Committee of the United Nations,  which the President described as "in substance a 
judicial body of high standing".  As Cooke P observed: 28 
If and when the matter does fall for decision, an aspect to be borne in mind may be one urged 
by counsel for the appellant: that since New Zealand's accession to the Optional Protocol the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee is in a sense part of this country's judicial structure, 
in that individuals subject to New Zealand jurisdiction have direct rights of recourse to it.  A 
failure to give practical effect to international instruments to which New Zealand is a party 
may attract criticism.  Legitimate criticism could extend to the New Zealand Courts if they 
were to accept the argument that, because a domestic statute giving discretionary powers in 
general terms does not mention international human rights norms or obligations, the executive 
is necessarily free to ignore them. 
These remarks did not enjoy enthusiastic endorsement from either Ministers or their 
advisers.  Indeed, it is fair to say that there is apprehension about what the Human Rights 
Committee might say about New Zealand. 
The observation that the Human Rights Committee is "in a sense part of this country's 
judicial structure" was echoed by Justice Tipping in Quilter v Attorney­General. 29 
VI HUMAN RIGHTS IN NEW ZEALAND 
The Human Rights Act 1993 added considerably to the grounds of discrimination 
articulated in the earlier legislation passed in 1977.  The long title of the Act says that it is 
an Act "to give better protection of human rights in New Zealand in general accordance 
with the United Nations Covenants or Conventions on Human Rights".  I pause to note 
that that is a rather generalised description of those treaty obligations.  The 1993 
legislation is certainly important legislation and a considerable advance on what went 
before.  It applies to private as well as public law situations.  It contains within it, 
however, measures which the Government recently has found it necessary to revisit. 
Among other things, the 1993 legislation contains three provisions that were designed 
to ensure that New Zealand law and practice conformed with the new Human Rights 
Act.  The provisions are as follows: 30 
28 [1994] 2 NZLR 266, 266. 
29 Unreported CA 200/96, Judgment of 17 December 1997, 10. 
30 Human Rights Act 1993, s 5.
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(i) To examine, before the 31st day of December 1998, the Acts and regulations that are in 
force in New Zealand, and any policy or administrative practice: 
(j) To determine, before the 31st day of December 1998, whether any of the Acts, 
regulations, policies, and practices examined under paragraph (i) of this subsection 
conflict with the provisions of Part II of this Act or infringe the spirit or intention of this 
Act: 
(k) To report to the Minister, before the close of the 31st day of December 1998, the results of 
the examination carried out under paragraph (i) of this subsection and the details of any 
determination made under paragraph (j) of this subsection: 
While the policy behind these provisions appears to be relatively straightforward, in 
reality the task of examining the New Zealand statute book and administrative practices 
to see that they do not offend against the new prohibited grounds of discrimination is a 
formidable task that requires a lot of effort and co­ordination. 
The Human Rights Act contains within it a substantial incentive to carry out the task. 
Section 151 of the Act provides as follows: 
151.  Other enactments and actions not affected– (1) Except as expressly provided in this Act, 
nothing in this Act shall limit or affect the provisions of any other Act or regulation which is in 
force in New Zealand. 
(2) Except as expressly provided in this Act, nothing in this Act relating to grounds of 
prohibited discrimination other than those described in paragraphs (a) to (g) of section 21(1) of 
this Act shall affect anything done by or on behalf of the Government of New Zealand. 
Section 151 expires with the close of the 31st day of December 1999 and, on the close 
of that day, "shall be deemed to be repealed". 
While the matter is not beyond legal doubt, the likely effect of this provision is that 
the human rights prohibitions contained in the Act could be given primacy over other 
statutes.  From a practical point of view, the implications of this are dramatic but from a 
human rights point of view entirely beneficial. 
The Coalition Government has not found this an easy issue to grapple with.  The 
review conducted by the Human Rights Commission has been known as Consistency 
2000.  Cabinet Papers that have been in free circulation in Wellington and which were 
considered in 1997 suggest that the Government considered providing itself with 
permanent legislative exemptions from the Act.  The Papers contained quite detailed 
conceptual material about the consequences of such exemptions. 
The international law advice on the matter was quite clear and robust.  It was 
summarised in one of the draft Cabinet Papers that was leaked:
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In summary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade advises that a permanent exemption for 
the Crown which covered the "old grounds" (race, colour, sex, etc.), as well as the "new 
grounds" would put New Zealand in clear breach of a number of major human rights treaties 
which are very widely accepted.  It would do serious damage to our international reputation. 
It would bring forward criticism from UN committees and would give many countries (e.g. 
Nigeria, Cambodia, Myanmar, etc.) whom we are trying to influence cheap ripostes to any 
representations we might make on their human rights records.  It would cement in many minds 
in Asia the suspicion that the "Pauline Hanson syndrome" is not unique to Australia. 
The Government appears to have flirted with some radical exemptions for itself but, 
in the end, drew back.  It is currently considering specific exemptions for specific 
purposes. 
The Government has decided to terminate the Consistency 2000 project.  This will 
require repeal of provisions in the Human Rights Act referred to earlier.  The 
Government has also decided that it will repeal section 151(1), that might have given 
primacy to human rights prohibitions after 1 January 2000.  That will ensure that the 
Human Rights Act will not limit nor affect the specific provisions of any other Act or 
regulation. 
The Government has rejected the Consistency 2000 approach on the basis that it is a 
"very detailed and centralised approach".  Henceforth Chief Executives of each 
Government Department will be responsible for making sure the Department is 
complying with the Act.  Existing legislation will be checked for compliance as it comes 
up for amendment. 
The policy that has been adopted, while not as extreme as some of the proposals 
contained in the earlier Cabinet Papers, is susceptible of serious criticism.  It significantly 
reduces New Zealand's commitment to the honouring of its human rights obligations.  It 
is likely once again to attract the attention of the Human Rights Committee which will 
quite possibly report adversely on the decision to backtrack from obligations solemnly 
entered into, and obligations which have been converted into New Zealand domestic law. 
It is possible that the proposed amendment of section 151(1) will itself be challenged 
under the First Optional Protocol. 
In that respect it is worthwhile examining how New Zealand has presented itself to 
the Human Rights Committee on this issue.
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VII NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT'S COMPLIANCE WITH COVENANT 
OBLIGATIONS? 
In introducing New Zealand's Initial Report under article 40 to the Human Rights 
Committee in 1983, the New Zealand Representative (Mr Beeby) stated that: 31 
... before his country had ratified the Covenant, it had found it necessary to undertake an 
extensive review of domestic law and practice.  The review had been lengthy owing to his 
country's wish to ensure scrupulous compliance with the obligations which it had been about to 
accept and to the fact that New Zealand was one of a minority of countries which had neither a 
written constitution nor a bill of rights in the sense in which that term was normally 
understood. 
Later during discussion with Committee members, New Zealand's Representative 
explained the Government's understanding as to the time frame for implementing its 
treaty obligations ­ including those under the ICCPR ­ in its law.  The Representative 
confirmed that: 32 
New Zealand regarded itself as required by the recognised rules of the law of treaties to give 
effect in its law and its practice to obligations imposed on it by a treaty immediately it became 
bound by the treaty. 
During this discussion, a number of Committee members were critical of New 
Zealand's lack of implementation of the Covenant's non­discrimination guarantees under 
articles 2(1) and 26. 33 
Twelve years later, New Zealand's non­compliance with the non­discrimination 
guarantees of the Covenant surfaced again, more acutely.  In a written question, the 
Human Rights Committee invited the Government to 34 
... clarify the effect of section 151(2) of the Human Rights Act 1993, which appears to postpone 
the operation of the new prohibited grounds of discrimination until 2000, and its compatibility 
with the Covenant. 
New Zealand's response to this question clearly showed an intention to implement 
Consistency 2000 in order to fulfil its obligations under the Covenant: 35 
31 CCPR/C/SR.481, para 2 (emphasis added). 
32 CCPR/C/SR 487, para 3. 
33 See, for example, CCPR/C/SR 481, paras 24 and 39 and SR 482, paras 2 and 39.  For the New 
Zealand Representative's response, see CCPR/C/SR 487, para 17. 
34 MFAT Information Bulletin No 54, above n 20, p 41 (emphasis added).
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Section 151(2) of the Human Rights Act 1993 provides that nothing in the Act affects anything 
done for or on behalf of the government of New Zealand which would otherwise amount to 
unlawful discrimination on the grounds of age, political opinion, employment status, family 
status or sexual orientation.  Section 151(2) expires on 31 December 1999.  The exemption in 
section 151(1) is intended to afford to the Government sufficient time to review its policies and 
practices and to implement all changes which may be required to ensure compliance with the 
Act.  A transitional period was considered necessary in view of the wider scope of the new 
legislation. 
Identification of the necessary administrative changes will be assisted by the Human Rights 
Commissioner under section 5(1) of the Act.  Section 5(1) of the Act requires the Human Rights 
Commission to examine all legislation and Government policies and practices to determine 
whether any legislation, policies and practices constitute unlawful discrimination, or conflict 
with the spirit of intention of the Act, and report to the Minister of Justice the results of its 
examination and determination by 31 December 1998.   The review began on 22 September 
1994. 
The Human Rights Committee was far from satisfied with this position.  Indeed, it 
was overtly critical.  Under the heading "Principal Subjects of Concern", the Committee 
wrote: 36 
The Committee regrets that the operation of the new prohibited grounds of discrimination, 
contained in Section 21 of the Human Rights Act 1993, is postponed until the year 2000.  It also 
takes note with concern that the prohibited grounds of discrimination do not include all the 
grounds in the Covenant and, in particular, that language is not mentioned as a prohibited 
ground of discrimination. 
Now that New Zealand has retreated from the criticised policy to an ever milder one, 
how can it present itself? 
Can New Zealand now truly say it endeavours to ensure "scrupulous compliance" 
with the Covenant's obligations?  In the three years since the Human Rights Committee's 
criticisms, New Zealand's position has become increasingly indefensible.  Once the 
Parliament legislates the approved policy of the Government by abandoning Consistency 
2000 and the sunset clause it will be open to severe criticism from the Committee. 
A full systematic and comprehensive study of the problems of New Zealand law and 
practice would have been greatly to our advantage so that New Zealand had a full 
35 MFAT Information Bulletin No 54, above n 20, p 47. 
36 Comments of the Human Rights Committee adopted at its 1411th meeting held on 5 April 1995, 
reproduced in MFAT Information Bulletin No 54, above n 20, p 68, para 13.
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inventory of exactly what its problems were in respect of the grounds of prohibited 
discrimination.  A systematic analysis of the whole of New Zealand statute law in terms 
of New Zealand's international human rights obligations would have been an invaluable 
resource in reshaping statutes over time.  Its loss is likely to be a real one in the years to 
come. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The issues will remain for New Zealand if domestic law does not comply with 
international obligations.  What steps are we going to take to ensure that our law does 
comply?  The answers to these issues are not readily apparent and the whole episode, 
while not catastrophic for human rights in New Zealand, will make it harder to argue 
that we are, as a country, as steadfast in pursuit of human rights principles as we 
represent ourselves to be at an international level. 
Why does the New Zealand Government require exemptions from the human rights 
obligations that it has solemnly legislated about?  What sort of example is that to the 
private sector which is bound while the public sector is not?  In the absence of a 
centralised effort that oversees the whole government it is likely that issue will drop off 
the end of the agenda.  New Zealand will be accused of a "go slow" policy on human 
rights and it will have no persuasive defence.  Funding has stopped.  The Human Rights 
Commission is doing no further work on Consistency 2000. 
One is left with the impression that the Government and the Parliament did not 
understand what they were doing when they set up the provisions of the Human Rights 
Act 1993 that they now wish to alter.  The Government machine found the Consistency 
2000 project too hard to carry out and Ministers did not like it.  Like all Ministers they 
like to think they are in charge.  But in the pragmatism that inevitably dominates New 
Zealand Governments of all political persuasions, it is easy to lose sight of principle. 
New Zealand may well have lost something of importance to its future in these decisions. 
It is hard to resist the conclusion that the whole episode shows that the impact of 
international law, and the importance of the human rights obligations that New Zealand 
has solemnly assumed by treaty, are not well understood within the Executive branch of 
the Government outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry of 
Justice.  Neither, it appears, do these human rights issues enjoy much political support. 
The matters reviewed here passed with little public commentary, analysis or debate.  It is 
doubtful that many ordinary New Zealanders know anything about them.  The 
Government must have calculated that any adverse comment that may be directed at 
New Zealand by the Human Rights Committee can be shrugged off. 
One ought not to be too critical of what has occurred.  The relationship of 
international law and municipal law are not well understood even at a time when their
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relationship is evolving.  The notion that what the New Zealand Parliament passes as 
legislation may be in breach of New Zealand's international treaty obligations is not 
something capable of being debated easily in Parliament or anywhere else.  But what we 
do know from examining the experience in other countries, and in this respect we need 
go no further afield than Australia, is that profound consequences can flow from 
international treaty obligations.  We need as a nation to improve our work rate on these 
issues and try to get to grips with them. 
As has been observed by Paul Hunt and Professor Margaret Bedggood "the 
distinction between international and domestic human rights protection is increasingly 
blurred". 37 In New Zealand the blurring has now become messy.  It needs to be properly 
sorted out.  We have a legal policy problem that has been swept under the carpet rather 
than solved.  As a result New Zealand's traditional commitment to human rights will be 
seen to be somewhat tarnished. 
New Zealand's problems with international treaties are not likely to be restricted to 
international human rights.  International environmental law and trade law are likely to 
present similar problems.  More will be heard of these issues in the years to come. 
37 "The International Law Dimension of Human Rights in New Zealand" in Grant Huscroft and Paul 
Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms: the NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 
(Brookers, Wellington, 1995).
